The effects of the liberalization of international trade are analyzed in a New Economic Geography model of a country with an asymmetric distribution of housing between regions. Labour is mobile between regions but not between countries. Trade liberalization tends to reduce inequalities in the distribution of population between the two regions, although population is always more unequally distributed than housing. Results are similar when there is a bias in preferences towards home-produced varieties of manufactures. If consumers care relatively little about housing and transport costs are high enough, an agglomerated equilibrium becomes stable.
Introduction
Does the promotion of international trade intensify or reduce regional disparities inside the country?
The standard theoretical approach to this issue builds on the New Economic Geography (NEG) model introduced by Krugman (1991) , in which there is a tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces. Centripetal forces arise from increasing returns to scale in one sector (manufacturing) combined with transport costs between regions/countries. Centrifugal forces arise either from an immobile factor of production in another sector (agriculture) that employs an exogenously given proportion of the labour force, as in Krugman and Venables (1995) The difference in the results arising from the two ways dispersion forces are generated is clearly explained by Alonso-Villar (2001) This paper also considers a model with congestion costs. It develops the tworegion model of Helpman (1998) , in which consumers' utility depends partly on the consumption of a non-traded good whose supply is fixed and immobile ("housing"). 1 An advantage of this model is that it can easily incorporate asymmetries between the regions, by allowing the distribution of housing to be unequal, which is more realistic than the usual symmetric model. We follow the route pioneered by Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) of adding to the model a third region (the rest of the world or ROW), trade with which involves 2 costs at least as high as between domestic regions. What we find is that, except in certain cases when inter-regional transport costs are very high, reducing barriers to international trade tends to reduce the inequality in the distribution of population between the two regions (although it always remains more unequally distributed than the stock of housing).
This effect arises because the consumption of home manufactures becomes less important relative to the consumption of housing when there is higher consumption of manufactured imports. We also consider an extension of the model in which consumers have a preference for home manufactures.
The Model
Let us assume that the world is composed of three geographical areas (1, 2, and 3), with . In the case of trade with the ROW, exports to the ROW are frictionless, while imports are subject to iceberg costs that cannot be lower than those for inter-regional trade. 3 Manufactured varieties are produced using only labour, with the sector being organized as a monopolistic competitive market, and production exhibits increasing returns to scale. Housing services are not tradable, with the supply in each region being fixed. Finally, labour is mobile between domestic regions but immobile internationally. All of these assumptions are similar to those of Helpman (1998) , except that in our model the country that reduces trade barriers on imports, the domestic economy, is composed of two (possibly asymmetric) regions. In Helpman (1998) the two countries are internally homogeneous.
Consumers
Consumers' utility in region i takes the following form: 
where ( ) i c k is the per capita consumption of variety k in Region i, and n is the mass or number of available varieties produced by the three regions ( )
n n n n = + + . Under this specification, the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, as well as the elasticity of demand of each variety (for n large enough), is:
The Cobb-Douglas utility function, together with the CES function for i m , means total consumption of each manufactured variety k in Region i is equal to:
where ( ) 
for for , ,
Producers
Production of each manufactured variety uses only labour, and is subject to increasing returns to scale. More specifically, the demand for labour by each firm in Region i to produce variety k is:
where ( ) i x k is the quantity produced of variety k by a firm located in region i, while 0 f > and 0 vc > are, respectively, the fixed and variable requirements of labour. The existence of fixed costs gives rise to increasing returns to scale, so each variety k is produced just by a single firm, because it is not profitable for two or more firms to produce the same variety.
Assuming firms seek to maximize profits, the producer price of each variety produced in Region i is equal to: 
As we can see, all firms located in the same region set the same price. Assuming free entry and exit of firms such that in equilibrium firms achieve zero profit ( )
( ) 
As equation (7) shows, the scale of production is constant and identical for all firms independently of where they are located. Assuming full employment we have:
Equilibrium conditions
The equilibrium condition for each manufactured variety produced either in Region 1 or 2 requires supply and demand to be equal. For Region 1 we have:
where the terms on the right hand side are, respectively, the total demand (including the quantity that melts in transit), by consumers of Regions 1, 2 and 3, of each variety produced in Region 1. Similar conditions hold for Regions 2 and 3. In condition (9) mi P is 5 the manufactured price index for region i, which is a decreasing function of the number of varieties locally produced:
and , 1,2
Assuming that housing is owned by absentee landlords 6 , total expenditure by residents of Region i is equal to:
With labour being mobile between domestic regions, we have that in equilibrium real incomes in Regions 1 and 2 must be equal. For the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the consumer price index ( ) hi mi ui P P P (13) where hi P is the price of housing services in Region i.
Assuming the total stock of housing in the domestic economy is H, and a share 1 h is located at Region 1, the equilibrium of the housing markets means:
Using (13), the indirect utility function in Region i is given by the real wage in i:
In equilibrium, and if the two domestic regions have a positive population, we have:
If for a given population distribution indirect utilities are not equalized across domestic regions ( ) 
6
3.
Characterizing the equilibrium 7 
A symmetric distribution of housing
Because any difference in real wages between the regions stimulates migration, there are two types of equilibrium: where the real wages are equal in the two regions, or where the whole of the population is in one region, but any person moving to the other region would receive a lower real wage. When the distribution of housing is symmetric, a symmetric distribution of labour is always an equilibrium, but it is not always a stable equilibrium.
Stability can be tested by solving for the relative wage in the two regions as a function of the distribution of labour, and plotting the result. If the region with a slightly larger labour force has a higher (lower) real wage, the symmetric equilibrium is unstable (stable).
As is the case with Helpman's model, the share of income expended on housing In their case, dispersion forces are generated by congestion costs rather than by a fixed supply of housing. If congestions costs are high enough and manufactured varieties are close substitutes (high ε), a dispersed equilibrium is stable unless transport costs are too high. The reason for this is that for a high elasticity of substitution consumers benefit little from access to a large number of varieties, so the negative effect of increasing commuting costs as population agglomerates in a single region more than compensates for the lower transport costs of having a larger number of varieties locally produced.
In the opposite case, when 1 βε < , the symmetrical equilibrium is stable only when transport costs are relatively low ( Figure 2 ). If inter-regional transport costs are very low (t = 1.1), the symmetrical equilibrium is stable for all values of international transport costs.
Conversely, if inter-regional transport costs are very high (t = 50), the symmetrical equilibrium is always unstable, and the stable equilibrium has 100 % of the population in 7 one region or the other. 8 In The difference between the two cases is that, when 1 βε < , consumers care mainly about consumption of more varieties of manufactures, and are willing to sacrifice a lot of housing to achieve that by living in the more populated region.
An asymmetric distribution of housing
Now let us assume that Region 1 always has more housing than region 2 ( ) An interesting result that emerges under an asymmetric distribution of housing is that the dispersed equilibrium, either stable or unstable, means population is distributed differently from that of housing. This result can be proved as follows. In first place, we have that a symmetric distribution of population cannot be an equilibrium, for L L ( )
Then, with an asymmetric distribution of housing, population must be also asymmetrically distributed in equilibrium. Two
, to be an equilibrium we need
. Using (14) , and the fact that in the larger region the nominal wage is higher, if L L 1 2 > is an equilibrium it means
< is an equilibrium, we must have
. Given the assumption that housing stock is larger in region 1 than in region 2, an special case to look at is when L L H H
were an equilibrium, using equation (14) allows to obtain that in this case the relative price of housing in region 1 is:
Looking at equation (18) 
Trade liberalization
In this section we focus on the effects of a reduction of import protection on the regional distribution of population in the dispersed stable equilibrium, when the distribution of housing is asymmetric.
The spatial distribution of economic activity between domestic regions results from the balance of centrifugal and centripetal forces. What are the potential effects that a reduction in τ may produce? With consumers looking for consuming a positive amount of every variety, we have that if the prices of manufactured varieties were the same, consumption of each variety will also be identical. However, under the existence of 9 transports costs, the consumption of varieties produced domestically is larger, then, ceteris paribus, consumers have an incentive to live where the number of locally produced varieties is larger. As τ is reduced the there is a substitution effect in favour of imported varieties. With the consumption of imported varieties becoming more important, we may then expect the price of housing having a greater incidence on the decision where to live.
So, as τ is reduced, populations should tend to distribute more in line with the supply of housing. As we can expect from the results of former section, the effects driven by changes in τ depend on the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between manufactured varieties (ε), as well as on the share of housing in the total expenditure (β). Figure 5D ).
Consumption bias
A property of the manufactured composite index m i as defined by equation (2) import ratio. Table 1 shows the figures when the country represents only 1 % of the world economy. Even with import protection, the participation of varieties produced by the ROW is still larger than tends to be observed in reality, even for extremely high levels of international trade costs.
This high import ratio can be corrected by introducing an asymmetry between the utility derived by consuming varieties produced by the home country and those produced by the ROW. There are at least two ways to introduce bias in consumers' preferences: by making use of the so-called "ideal variety" approach (Lancaster, 1979) , or by keeping the "love for variety" formulation (Spence,1976; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) represented by equation (2) and introducing share parameters. We follow the second route.
Let us assume that for Regions i=1,2 the composite i m takes the following form:
In equation (19) Under the same assumptions on the producer side, as in the case without consumption bias, the scale of production is the same for all varieties, wherever they are produced. Also, the producer price of all varieties produced in the same region is identical Table 2 summarizes the effects of introducing bias in preferences for low interregional transport costs (t = 1.1), 1 0 6 . h = and 1 βε < . As one would expect, when γ is increased the share in manufacture consumption of varieties produced in the ROW falls. 12 Table 3 shows the effect of γ on the distribution of labour for the same parameter values. Before looking at the effects of changes in γ , let us point out that an increase in the relative size of the ROW induces a more symmetric distribution of population between the two domestic regions. The reason for this result is that as the ROW becomes larger, the consumption of domestic varieties becomes relatively less important than the consumption of foreign varieties, such that the incentive to agglomerate in order to reduce the burden of domestic trade costs is somewhat reduced. It still possible, however, to observe that in equilibrium population is more concentrated than housing ( )
As γ increases, labour tends to become somewhat more concentrated in the region with more housing.
Recall that, in Figure 4 , for 1 βε < and t = 2.3, as τ increases, there is a stable equilibrium where Region 2 is empty of population and another stable equilibrium where Region 1 is either empty or has a very small population. As γ increases from 1/3 towards 1/2, the threshold combinations of t and τ at which this occurs fall. In other words a dispersed equilibrium that is stable when 1 3 γ = may not be so when γ is higher.
A final issue is whether the presence of preference bias affects the rate at which regions' size converge as τ is reduced. Figure 6 maps the effects of reducing import protection for the same parameter values as in Tables 2 and 3, and for 
γ =
(the same pattern is evident in Table 3 ). This happens because changes in trade protection matter very little both when consumers' desire for imported varieties shrinks to zero ( γ approaches 1/2), and when imported varieties are so dominant in the consumption of manufactures that there is little incentive to be in the region that produces more manufactured varieties (the country is small compared with the ROW and γ approaches 1/3). 
Summary and conclusions
Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) argue that the import substitution policy followed by many developing countries during most of the second half of the twentieth century 12 generated, or at least intensified, a process of population and production concentration, leading to the emergence of industrial centres whose production was mainly intended for the domestic market. Can trade liberalization affect this geographical structure?
In order to throw some light on this question, we adapted Helpman's model to analyze the case where a domestic economy composed of two asymmetric regions reduces trade barriers on imports from the ROW. As is standard in NEG models, the agglomeration forces are generated through the inclusion of a sector that produces manufactured varieties under increasing returns to scale whose trade is subject to transport costs, and assuming labour is mobile between domestic regions (but not between countries). Dispersion forces are generated, as in Helpman (1998) , by introducing a fixed regional supply of housing, which is not tradable between regions. This model has the advantage that it can easily incorporate asymmetries between the regions.
In this environment, and assuming an asymmetric distribution of housing, a reduction in trade costs on imports from the ROW tends to induce, ceteris paribus, a more equal distribution of population between the two domestic regions, so that manufactured production becomes less concentrated. This result is explained by the fact that, as imports becomes cheaper through trade liberalization, consumers seek to minimize the burden of housing costs, which are larger in the more populated region because the quantity of housing per capita is lower there (labour is always more unequally distributed than housing, except when there is no transport costs between domestic regions).
The picture is essentially the same when we allow for consumer preferences in the home country to be biased in favour of domestically produced varieties. In the presence of consumption biases, the effect of trade liberalization on regions' size tends to be larger (when 1 βε > ), except in the case of extreme preferences for home-produced manufactures. 
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β ε = = 2 The notion of iceberg costs means that for each unit of an imported variety that is consumed, more than 1 unit must be shipped from the exporting region. 3 Here we follow Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) . This asymmetry in international transport costs is innocuous to the results of the model. 4 t ( ) τ is the quantity of each variety that must be shipped by a domestic (foreign) firm for 1 unit to arrive to the importing region. 5 As Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) point out, t should be interpreted as "natural" transport costs, while τ is a combination of natural transport costs and artificial trade barriers. 6 Helpman (1998) assumes the stock of housing is evenly owned by all population. The assumption of absentee landlords is innocuous to the results of the model but it simplifies greatly the expression for regions' expenditure. 7 Because of the complexity of equations (15) and (16) 
ε =
, H=1 and L 3 =2. 8 To be more precise, under a Cobb-Douglas utility function, we have that unless domestic transport costs are infinity, no region can ever be empty because the price of housing would be zero and any migrant could reach an infinite level of utility when first moving to this region. 9 By free trade we refer to the case when domestic and international transport costs are the same. , we rule out the possibility of consumers having a greater preference for foreign varieties. 12 In all simulations it is assumed that consumers of Region 3 have no bias in preferences ( ) 1 3 θ = . 13 The same pattern arises if we look at level changes instead of percentage changes.
